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INTRODUCTION
Administrative law and scholarship are built upon a set of
assumptions about the institutions that comprise the administrative state.
Existing scholarship has focused almost exclusively on federal
administrative agencies. As a result, many of the familiar arguments about
the role of politics in agency decision-making or the desirability of judicial
review are premised on a vision of a sprawling, expert-laden bureaucracy
situated within the executive branch.1
As I argued in Substance and Procedure in Local Administrative
Law, many of these assumptions start to break down at the local level,
*
Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I am
grateful to the participants of the Public Law in the States Conference at the University of
Wisconsin Law School for their many helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier
draft. And I would like to add a special note of thanks to Miriam Seifter and Rob Yablon
for bringing the group together and for all of the work they’ve done to create a community
for those of us who write about state and local government. Keenan Roarty and Joe
Hamaker provided invaluable research assistance throughout this project. Any mistakes,
however, are of course my own.
1.
There are, of course, a number of important exceptions. See, e.g., Nestor M.
Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 568–69 (2017); Aaron Saiger,
Local Government as a Choice of Agency Form, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 423, 425 (2016); Miriam
Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV. 483, 484–85 (2017); Miriam
Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
107, 109–10 (2018); William Funk, Rationality Review of State Administrative
Rulemaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 147, 147 (1991); Michael Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the
Laboratories: State Deference Standards and Their Implications for Improving the
Chevron Doctrine, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 977, 978 (2008).

1232

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

where a great deal of regulatory activity takes place.2 The local agencies
responsible for determining the layout and density of various
neighborhoods, or promulgating detailed regulations for local businesses,
often look nothing like their federal counterparts. Outside the larger cities,
for example, detailed health and land use regulations often are
promulgated by all-volunteer boards with varying degrees of relevant
expertise.3 The matters they deal with also tend to be quite a bit less
complex.4 Deference doctrines premised on the inscrutability of federal
regulations or on claims of agency expertise may be harder to justify where
local agencies are concerned.5
The focus of this Essay is on still another distinct feature of local
administration—the fact that at the local level, many of the entities
responsible for “administering” various statutory schemes are not in fact
agencies at all. In jurisdictions large and small, local legislative bodies,
including municipal councils and county boards, engage in a great deal of
“administrative” activity. They grant permits, approve zoning variances,
and hear disciplinary appeals.6 Because states often give localities
considerable leeway in designing local governance processes, the exact
same function might in one jurisdiction be performed by a town council
and in the next town over by an administrative board.7 In performing these
functions, both entities would, at least in theory, be subject to the same
procedural requirements and substantive standards of review.
The problem, as courts occasionally have recognized, is that the
requirements of administrative law do not always translate neatly into the
legislative sphere. Administrative law, for example, is notoriously
ambivalent about the role of politics in agency decision-making.8
Although courts cite political accountability as a basis for deference
generally, they typically are unwilling to consider political justifications
for individual agency decisions. The often-unstated rationale is that
“politics” is simply not what agencies are designed to do. When
administrative decisions are made by purely political bodies, however, one
might reasonably wonder whether politics could legitimately play a
greater role.

2.
See Maria Ponomarenko, Substance and Procedure in Local Administrative
Law, 170 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 7–9),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =3792435 (describing the range of
activities that local agencies perform).
3.
Id. (manuscript at 25–26).
4.
Id. (manuscript at 24–25).
5.
See id. (manuscript at 46–49).
6.
See infra notes 11–19 and accompanying text.
7.
See infra notes 11–23 and accompanying text.
8.
See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and
Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 18–19 (2009).
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This Essay examines the phenomenon of “legislative administration”
and considers the degree to which it is compatible with the requirements
of administrative law. Part I provides a taxonomy of local legislative
decision-making and points to a variety of local legislative actions that fall
within the purview of administrative law. Part II highlights the challenges
that courts have faced in applying various administrative law doctrines in
the legislative context. Part III concludes with some preliminary thoughts
on how courts and legislatures might go about reconciling the practical
realities of legislative administration with the demands of modern
administrative law.
I. THE PREVALENCE OF LEGISLATIVE ADMINISTRATION
Functionally speaking, the various tasks that local legislative bodies
perform fall along a continuum, from those that are more obviously
“legislative” to those that are best characterized as “administrative.”9 On
the far legislative side of the spectrum are local ordinances adopted
pursuant to the locality’s general “police powers.” When acting in this
capacity, local legislative bodies may still be bound by general state
requirements around public meetings, as well as a general obligation to
promote the public good.10 But they have considerable leeway in crafting
legislative responses to the problems that they or their constituents
perceive.11
Falling somewhere toward the middle are the ordinances adopted
pursuant to more specific grants of legislative authority. When it comes to
zoning, for example, states typically authorize local legislative bodies to
enact zoning and land use ordinances—but they impose far more
constraints on how that authority may be used. State law typically defines
the permissible aims of local “legislative” zoning, and it sets out the oftenelaborate processes that municipalities must follow in making changes to
local zoning laws.12 Some states require local legislative bodies to first
9.
See generally Saiger, supra note 1, at 425 (describing local legislative
activity as falling “along a spectrum that ranges from pure sovereignty to pure agency”).
10.
See, e.g., SANDRA M. STEVENSON & WENDY VAN WIE, 2 ANTIEAU ON LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW § 26.12 (2d ed. 2021) (describing applicability of open meeting laws
to various local legislative and administrative bodies).
11.
See, e.g., Ames Rental Prop. Ass’n v. City of Ames, 736 N.W.2d 255, 263
(Iowa 2007) (“[I]t is the City’s prerogative to fashion remedies to problems affecting its
residents. If the ordinance proves to be ineffective, then the elected city council may change
course and amend or repeal it.”).
12.
See, e.g., TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 211.003 (West 2021). See generally
id. § 211. Although some states impose few substantive constraints on local zoning
authority, others have interpreted state zoning laws more restrictively. See, e.g., S.
Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 731–32 (N.J. 1975)
(prohibiting municipalities from adopting exclusionary zoning policies that functionally
exclude all lower income housing).
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commission a study by the local planning commission or to assess the
environmental or economic impacts of any changes proposed.13 In these
contexts, local “legislation” starts to look more like administrative
rulemaking pursuant to a broad statutory scheme.
Other tasks are even more obviously “administrative.” When it comes
to zoning, for example, many states leave it up to local legislatures to
decide whether to create a zoning board to handle individual disputes or
simply to perform that function themselves.14 As a result, local legislative
bodies often are responsible for approving new construction projects and
granting individual variances from comprehensive zoning codes. Local
legislatures also grant liquor licenses.15 They approve new nightclubs and
gaming establishments.16 And they license motels, convenience stores, car
dealerships, and other businesses.17
Legislative bodies also routinely conduct termination hearings and
adjudicate disciplinary appeals. In Kentucky, for example, police officers
facing discipline or termination are entitled to a hearing before the city
council.18 The city council, like any other adjudicative body, must conduct
a hearing on the record, and its decision is then subject to judicial review.19
Similar provisions exist in a variety of other jurisdictions as well—for
firemen, for department heads, and various other categories of civil service
employees.20

13.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 462.355 (2020).
14.
See, e.g., id. § 462.354 (“The governing body of any municipality . . . shall
provide by ordinance for a board of appeals and adjustments . . . [or] may provide
alternatively . . . that the governing body . . . serve as the board of appeals and adjustments
. . . .”).
15.
See, e.g., Taleb v. City of Tuscaloosa, 296 So. 3d 874, 880–81 (Ala. Civ. App.
2019); Micius v. St. Paul City Council, 524 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
16.
See, e.g., Sherald v. City of Myrtle Beach, No. 2010-UP-449, 2010 WL
10085572 (S.C. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2010) (night club); Nev. Rest. Serv., Inc. v. City of Las
Vegas, No.: 2:15-cv-2240-GMN-GWF, 2015 WL 7783536 (D. Nev. Dec. 3, 2015) (gaming
establishment).
17.
See, e.g., Amrik Singh & SBPS, Inc. v. City of Greenville, 681 S.E.2d 921
(S.C. Ct. App. 2009) (motel); Amina, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, No. A06-2172, 2008 WL
223250, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (convenience store); Lindquist v. City of Pasadena,
525 F.3d 383, 384 (5th Cir. 2008) (car dealership); Troje v. City Council, 245 N.W.2d 596,
600 (Minn. 1976) (garbage collection business).
18.
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 95.450 (West 2021).
19.
Id. §§ 95.450–.460.
20.
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-704 (2021) (firemen); ALA. CODE § 45-17A82.09 (2021) (department heads); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-1106 (West 2021) (all civil
service personnel); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. § 14408 (2021) (all civil service personnel); see
also Holecek v. City of Hiawatha, No. 09-CV-113-LRR, 2010 WL 3927801, at *1–4 (N.D.
Iowa Oct. 4, 2010) (discussing a city council termination hearing for a parks employee in
Hiawatha, Iowa); Bravo v. City of Hubbard, No. 07-1783-HO, 2008 WL 5046396, at *1–
2 (D. Or. Nov. 19, 2008) (discussing a city council termination hearing for a police officer
in Hubbard, Oregon).
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Finally, legislatures are at times assigned to perform functions that,
at least in theory, would seem to require a fair bit of technical expertise.
For example, under environmental protection laws in four states
(California, Minnesota, Washington, and New York), local governments
must assess the potential environmental impacts of all proposed
development projects—ranging from park trails to new housing
construction.21 In a number of other states, local governments must
conduct environmental reviews in a more limited set of circumstances—
for example, when approving a new landfill site.22 The required reports
can number in the tens if not hundreds of pages and involve a variety of
technical assessments—such as predicted impact on local groundwater
resources and wildlife populations.23 And although local legislatures
typically hire consultants or enlist the help of city staff, they ultimately are
responsible for signing off on the findings and for making whatever
determinations a particular statute requires.24
In many jurisdictions, legislative administration persists largely as a
matter of necessity. In tiny hamlets with just a handful of employees, it
may not be feasible to create a bevy of administrative agencies to perform
the various adjudicative tasks demanded by state law. Preserving local
control over certain administrative functions may mean leaving them in
the hands of a town council or the county board.
Yet just as often, the decision to vest administrative authority in a
legislative body is done as a matter of choice. Land use statutes, for
example, often assign local legislative bodies a formal role in adjudicating
individual disputes, even in jurisdictions that have more robust
bureaucratic structures in place.25 And in California, the state’s
environmental review statute expressly provides that if an initial report is

21.
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21151 (West 2021); MINN. STAT. § 116D.04 (2020);
N.Y. ENV’T CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109 (McKinney 2021); WASH. REV. CODE. § 43.21C.030
(2021).
22.
See, e.g., 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/39.2 (West 2021) (landfill siting
decisions).
23.
See, e.g., MINN. ENV’T QUALITY BD., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
WORKSHEET
(2013),
https://www.eqb.state.mn.us/sites/default/files/documents/Finalized%20EAW%20Form
%20July2013.
Indeed, California makes this explicit: if an impact assessment is initially
24.
certified by an “unelected” entity, aggrieved parties have a right to appeal to the
jurisdiction’s elected body. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21151 (West 2021) (“If a nonelected
decisionmaking body . . . certifies an environmental impact report . . . that certification . .
. may be appealed to the agency’s elected decisionmaking body, if any.”).
25.
See, e.g., 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/39.2 (providing that all siting
decisions for municipal waste facilities be made by the “governing body” of the relevant
county or municipality).
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prepared by an appointed entity, an aggrieved party may appeal to the
jurisdiction’s legislative body as a matter of right.26
To be sure, “legislative administration” is hardly a new
phenomenon.27 In the early years of the American republic, legislative
bodies at all levels of government did a great deal more “administering”
than they do today.28 For example, as Maggie (McKinley) Blackhawk and
others have written, the nineteenth-century Congress maintained a robust
system of petitions and private bills to provide redress to a host of private
claims.29 Petitioners requested veterans’ pensions and disaster relief.30
They sought patents for their inventions.31 And they asked Congress to
affirm their right to ownership over specific tracts of formerly public
land.32 Each year, Congress adopted hundreds—and sometimes
thousands—of “private bills” acceding to these various requests.33
Over time, however, legislative administration at both the federal and
state levels largely was supplanted by the rise of the administrative state.
Faced with a crushing volume of individual claims, Congress gradually
siphoned off various categories of petitioners into the administrative
process.34 As Blackhawk points out, Congress largely dismantled its
petition system by the mid-1940s, around the same time that it formalized
26.
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21151.
27.
See, e.g., Barbara Aronstein Black, Who Judges? Who Cares? History Now
and Then, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 749, 753–57 (2010) (describing widespread practice of
“legislative adjudication” in colonial America); Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional
Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1381, 1435–46 (1998) (describing pervasiveness of legislative adjudication in
colonial New York).
28.
See generally Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the
Administrative State, 127 YALE L.J. 1538 (2018) (highlighting the modern shift in the
administrative state); see also James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and
Private Bills, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1866 (2010) (describing use of private bills to
indemnify government officials from liability).
29.
McKinley, supra note 28, at 1564. See also Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant
Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 18011829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1731 (2017) (“From the viewpoint of the first quarter of the
nineteenth century, claims adjudication was standard legislative business . . . .”).
30.
McKinley, supra note 28, at 1589 (veteran pensions); MICHELE LANDIS
DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
WELFARE STATE 17–19 (2012) (disaster relief).
31.
McKinley, supra note 28, at 1565; see also Andrew Tutt, Unique
Copyrights, 95 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 390, 393 (2013).
32.
Mashaw, supra note 29, at 1710 (describing the large volume of “petitions
or congressional actions on petitions for relief from statutory requirements, legislative
confirmation of claims, grants of preemptive rights, [and] authority to withdraw erroneous
locations of claims” with respect to the settlement of public lands).
33.
McKinley, supra note 28, at 1591–92.
34.
Id. at 1579–93 (describing the creation of the Court of Claims and the Bureau
of Pensions as part of a long trajectory of shifting adjudicative responsibility for various
claims from Congress to the administrative state).
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judicial control over administrative procedure under the federal
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).35
Local legislative administration persisted at the local level—but it
departed from the historical tradition in one important way: unlike “private
bills” in Congress, which largely escaped judicial scrutiny,36 legislative
adjudication now is subject to the familiar constraints of modern
administrative law.37 As Ann Woolhandler suggests, the judicialization of
legislative administration likely had something to do with the rise of the
administrative state.38 Over time, as legislatures delegated a slew of
adjudicative functions to administrative bodies, courts responded by
imposing a variety of procedural and substantive constraints.39 Having
done so in the administrative context, however, exempting legislative
bodies from these same requirements when they performed functionally
identical tasks became increasingly untenable.40 Thus, in Londoner v.
Denver,41 the Supreme Court ruled that city councils must comply with the
basic requirements of procedural due process when they adjudicate
individual claims.42 Various other requirements have since followed suit.43
These days, when a local legislative body rules on a conditional use
permit or reviews a disciplinary appeal, it typically is required to conduct
a hearing on the record and to issue a written order explaining the basis for
the decision made.44 Depending on the statutory scheme at issue, a court
may then be authorized to review the decision to ensure that it is supported
by “substantial evidence” or that the legislative body has taken a
sufficiently “hard look” at the evidence and arguments before it.45
As the next Part makes clear, the extension of these administrative
law standards into the legislative sphere presents a variety of challenges
that courts have at times struggled to resolve.

35.
Id. at 1548.
36.
See id.
37.
See Ann Woolhandler, Delegation and Due Process: The Historical
Connection, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 226 (2008) (detailing the Supreme Court’s gradual
shift toward insisting that legislative bodies comply with administrative norms).
38.
See id. at 256–64.
39.
See id. at 262–63.
40.
See id. at 254–64.
41.
210 U.S. 373, 378 (1908).
42.
Id. at 385–86.
43.
Woolhandler, supra note 37, at 266.
44.
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)–(iii).
45.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Lenz, 811 N.Y.S.2d 210 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)
(considering whether the City Council of Saratoga Springs took a “hard look” at the
environmental concerns generated by a proposed development).
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II. POLITICS AND EXPERTISE IN LEGISLATIVE ADMINISTRATION
Courts ordinarily pay little attention to the institutional character of
the decision maker in question. With some exceptions, administrative law
at both the federal and state levels is both uniform and trans-substantive—
which is to say that the same standards and requirements apply across
different agencies and subject areas.46
When legislative bodies perform administrative functions, however,
the institutional character of the decision maker in question is much harder
to ignore. And as a result, both state and federal courts have at times
grappled with how best to translate familiar administrative law principles
into the legislative sphere. This Part describes two particular areas of
contention around the respective roles of politics and expertise in agency
decision-making.
A. The Place of Politics in Agency Decision-Making
Politics traditionally has had an uneasy place in administrative law.
Federal courts, for example, routinely acknowledge that agencies are
situated within the “political branches” and therefore are entitled to make
the sorts of policy determinations that judges cannot.47 At the same time,
courts also have generally dismissed the notion that political
considerations may be used to justify any particular decision that an
agency might reach. In Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Assoc. v. State
Farm Mutual,48 for example, the Supreme Court implicitly rejected the
idea that a shift from one administration to another alone could justify a
change in policy in the absence of some other shift in the evidence
available to the agency or the circumstances on the ground.49 Since then,
writes Kathryn Watts, “the blanket rejection of politics in administrative
decision-making has been casually accepted as the status quo by courts,
agencies, and scholars alike.”50
When adjudicative decisions are made by legislative bodies,
however, the impact of politics is inescapable. The entire body of law

46.
The same is generally true in constitutional law as well. As I pointed out in
Administrative Rationality Review, for example, federal courts routinely apply the same
constitutional rational basis test to both legislative and administrative regulation, despite
the fact that the justifications for the permissive standard are largely inapplicable to the
administrative sphere. Maria Ponomarenko, Administrative Rationality Review, 104 VA. L.
REV. 1399, 1422–36 (2018).
47.
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984) (justifying deference in part based on agencies’ political pedigree).
48.
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
49.
See Watts, supra note 8, at 5–6 (describing the ways in which State Farm in
particular has been read to foreclose a place for politics in federal agency decision-making).
50.
Id. at 7.
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around legislative administration is premised on the idea that legislators
wear “multiple hats.”51 One minute they are politicians representing their
constituents’ interests—and another they are “neutral administrators”
tasked with adjudicating a particular dispute. In practice, however, it is
doubtful that either legislators or voters fully buy into this distinction.
Voters expect legislators to represent their interests, whether in passing
new legislation or in rejecting a proposed development on their quiet
residential block. As one court acknowledged, “legislators will find the
opinions of angry constituents compelling” whether or not they are legally
relevant to the decision they are being asked to make.52
The tension between the legal fiction of the “neutral legislative
administrator” and the practical reality of local legislative politics has
created a series of doctrinal puzzles that courts have struggled to
adequately resolve. This Section describes two of the ways that courts
have attempted to carve out a place for local politics in both substantive
and procedural review.
1. POLITICS AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
One of the clearest examples of the potential conflict between
legislative politics and the norms of administrative adjudication is in the
context of new cellular tower construction, which is governed by a mix of
local zoning regulations and the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996
(TCA).53 Mobile phones depend on a vast network of antennas and
transmitters to ensure stable coverage. Every time a mobile carrier wants
to install a new tower, it must first obtain approval from the local zoning
authority.54 The problem is that although society as a whole would benefit
from having a seamless network of cellular facilities, individual
municipalities often have an incentive to insist that new towers be situated
in someone else’s backyard.55
The TCA was designed to address this classic collective action
problem in a number of ways. First, although it left municipalities with

51.
See, e.g., Petrovich Dev. Co. v. City of Sacramento, 48 Cal. App. 5th 963,
973 (2020) (“City council members wear multiple hats. It is commonly understood that
they function as local legislators. But sometimes they act in a quasi-adjudicatory capacity
similar to judges.”); Aegerter v. City of Delafield, 174 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1998)
(“[M]unicipal councils often wear several hats when they act. When they are passing
ordinances or other laws, they are without a doubt legislators, but when they sit as an
administrative body making decisions about zoning permits, they are like any other agency
the state has created.”)
52.
PrimeCo Pers. Commc’ns, L.P. v. Village of Fox Lake, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1052,
1063 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
53.
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A).
54.
See id. § 332(c)(7).
55.
See PrimeCo, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1063 (describing the goals of the TCA).
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considerable leeway to decide where towers may be placed—and to
demand various modifications to limit their effect on the surrounding
areas—it barred local actions that have the purpose or effect of
“prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.”56 It also took
certain considerations off the table, most notably the environmental and
health effects of radio frequency transmissions, so long as the mobile
carrier complied with Federal Communications Commission regulations
designed to ensure that emissions remained at safe levels.57 Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the TCA required that any local government
decision to deny a request to construct or modify a wireless facility be
made “in writing and supported by substantial evidence.”58 As the
Supreme Court confirmed in T-Mobile South v. Roswell,59 this is the same
“substantial evidence” standard used throughout federal administrative
law.60 In short, any denial would have to be based on “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”61
A key question that courts have grappled with in the context of the
TCA is whether constituent opposition to the construction of new cell
towers, standing alone, could constitute substantial evidence to justify a
denial. Ordinarily, the federal substantial evidence standard requires
something more than “a mechanical nose count” of witnesses for and
against.62 Its extension into the realm of local land use policy, however,
prompted a number of federal courts to question whether the same rules
should apply when decisions are made by legislative bodies. Most notably,
in AT & T Wireless PCS v. City Council of Virginia Beach,63 the Fourth
Circuit held that when a permitting decision is made by a local legislature,
constituent preferences may indeed carry decisive weight.64 The court
explained that “[t]he ‘reasonable mind’ of a legislator is not necessarily
the same as the ‘reasonable mind’ of a bureaucrat” and that courts should
keep these differences in mind when applying the “substantial evidence”
test.65
The debate over AT & T’s proposed cell towers in Virginia Beach
played out in relatively predictable fashion. After contracting with a local
church to install two cell towers on its property in exchange for $60,000

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
61.
62.
64.
65.

§ 332(c)(7)(B)(i).
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
574 U.S. 293 (2015).
Id. at 301–02.
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
Sahara Coal Co. v. Fitts, 39 F.3d 781, 782 (7th Cir. 1994).
155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 430.
Id.
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in annual rent, the mobile carrier approached the city to secure the
necessary approvals.66 AT & T put forward a slew of experts who testified
to the necessity of the towers, as well as their minimal impact on the
surrounding area.67 In hearings before the Planning Commission and the
city council, however, dozens of residents testified in opposition to the
tower, arguing that the 135-foot towers did not belong in their residential
neighborhood.68 Although the City Planning Department and the Planning
Commission (i.e., the “bureaucrats”) recommended approval, the city
council voted to deny the application, relying primarily on the residents’
concerns.69
In upholding the denial, the Fourth Circuit explained that “[i]t is not
only proper but even expected that a legislature and its members will
consider the views of their constituents to be particularly compelling forms
of evidence.”70 Although AT & T’s experts had made a strong case in favor
of approval, the views of residents “will often trump those of bureaucrats
or experts in the minds of reasonable legislators.”71 In this case, “the
repeated and widespread opposition of a majority of the citizens of
Virginia Beach who voiced their views . . . amounts to far more than a
‘mere scintilla’ of evidence to persuade a reasonable mind to oppose the
application.”72 Indeed, the court added, “we should wonder at a legislator
who ignored such opposition.”73
As a descriptive matter, the Fourth Circuit’s conception of the
legislative process is undoubtedly spot on. A room full of angry
constituents is often going to be quite a bit more convincing than a stack
of expert reports.74 And although the Fourth Circuit likely overstates the
difference between the “bureaucrats” who serve on a local planning
commission and the politicians who serve on the city council, it
undoubtedly is true that, on balance, the council members are more likely
to be swayed by their constituents’ concerns.
Yet there are reasons to doubt whether the Fourth Circuit’s solicitous
approach to local politics is in fact compatible with the requirements of
substantive judicial review. Ordinarily, where courts have acknowledged
that certain judgments are inherently political, they also have foresworn
66.
Id. at 425.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 431 & n.6.
69.
Id. at 425, 430.
70.
Id. at 430.
71.
Id.
72.
Id. at 431.
73.
Id.
74.
See, e.g., Alltel Corp. v. City of Jackson, 466 F. Supp. 3d 673, 681 (S.D.
Miss. 2020) (“Councilman Aaron Banks felt he had ‘a responsibility . . . to the people that
elected [him]’ and those people ‘had made their voices very clear to oppose’ the
application.”).
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the possibility of meaningful judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court’s
permissive “rational basis” test, for example, which governs constitutional
review of ordinary economic legislation,75 is best understood as a tacit
acknowledgement of the fact that economic legislation often is the product
of interest group wrangling and that courts have no way of judging
whether a particular bargain is a good one.76
The Fourth Circuit’s struggle to apply the Virginia Beach standard in
subsequent cases illustrates why politics and substantive review ordinarily
do not mix. The first problem that the Fourth Circuit quickly encountered
in applying the Virginia Beach standard is that the TCA expressly
prohibits municipalities from taking health concerns into account.77 For
residents facing the prospect of having a new cell tower go up in their
neighborhood, however, health concerns often are top of mind. Thus, in a
subsequent case, the Fourth Circuit clarified that although “the Act does
not preclude residents from expressing such concerns to their
representatives,” a reasonable legislator would not take those concerns
into account.78 (To be sure, this narrow concession is not necessarily
inconsistent with a desire to let politics prevail. After all, courts routinely
deem certain legislative purposes, such as racial animus, to be illegitimate
while otherwise deferring to the political bargains that legislators strike.79)
The bigger problem was that once the Fourth Circuit established that
constituent preferences could potentially amount to “substantial
evidence,” it found itself in the awkward position of having to articulate
precisely how much opposition would be sufficient to justify a denial. For
example, in T-Mobile Northeast v. Newport News,80 the court pointed out
that only three residents showed up to speak in opposition to the proposed
tower and one other had sent an email—a far cry from the several hundred
who had testified or signed petitions in Virginia Beach.81 That same year,
however, when twenty-one Fairfax County residents testified that
“facilities of this type do not belong in a residential community such as
ours,” the Fourth Circuit deemed this sufficient to satisfy the substantial
evidence test.82 The line, it seems, was somewhere between twenty-one
and four.
It is not clear, however, on what basis the Fourth Circuit concluded
that a “reasonable” legislator would be swayed by testimony from twenty75.
FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
75.
Ponomarenko, supra note 46, at 1425–27.
77.
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).
78.
T-Mobile Ne. LLC v. Newport News, 674 F.3d 380, 390 (4th Cir. 2012).
79.
See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265–66 (1977).
80.
674 F.3d at 380.
81.
Id. at 389.
82.
New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 674
F.3d 270, 273, 275 (4th Cir. 2012).
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one residents but ignore the impassioned objections of four. Presumably
the city council members in Newport News had some reason to think that
they would be better off politically in denying the cellphone company’s
petition. Maybe the four residents who spoke in opposition to the towers
were particularly influential. Maybe the council members knew from past
experience that they would eventually face blowback for approving the
proposed towers, even if initial opposition was relatively muted. Certainly
the city council members were in a better position to assess the strength of
constituent preferences than the judges on the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Perhaps the strongest objection to the Fourth Circuit’s approach is
that it risks undermining the very objectives that the statute was designed
to promote. As one district court explained, the Fourth Circuit “is entirely
correct that legislators will find the opinions of angry constituents
compelling. But validating this reasoning would nullify Congress’s goals
of reducing regulation, rapidly deploying new telecommunications
technologies, and providing nationwide cellular services.”83 It is precisely
because local legislators often are swayed by the whims of their
constituents that Congress adopted the TCA in the first place. In this
regard, administration is fundamentally different from ordinary legislative
policymaking. Once some higher-level decision-making body—in this
case Congress—has articulated a specific set of policy goals, it has in
effect foreclosed the possibility of relitigating them in each individual
case.
Eventually, the Fourth Circuit retreated still further from Virginia
Beach by clarifying that in order for community opposition to amount to
substantial evidence, the residents’ concerns must themselves be
reasonable. “[A] ‘reasonable legislator,’” the court explained, “would not
base his decision upon the irrational concerns of a few constituents.”84 Of
course, if the objections to a proposed tower are reasonable, it should not
matter whether they were expressed by constituents or by the legislators
themselves. After all, one would think that elected officials would be
perfectly capable of assessing whether a proposed tower is out of step with
the character of a particular neighborhood. In a representative democracy,
voters do not need to show up at every town meeting in order to see their
preferences enacted in law. In short, once the reasons themselves must be
sound, it no longer appears that politics is actually doing any work.

83.
PrimeCo Pers. Commc’ns, L.P. v. Village of Fox Lake, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1052,
1063 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
84.
Petersburg Cellular P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors of Nottoway Cnty., 205
F.3d 688, 696 (4th Cir. 2000).

1244

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
2. LEGISLATIVE “NEUTRALITY”

Legislative administration also poses a distinct set of challenges when
it comes to the requirement of a hearing before a “neutral
decisionmaker”—an element of procedural due process that states have
since codified in a variety of administrative contexts.85
The contours of neutrality are variable and imprecise, but there
nevertheless are a few basic principles that courts have more or less
consistently applied. For example, courts generally agree that a decision
maker should be disqualified as biased if they have a personal stake in the
matter—which may include a pecuniary interest in the outcome or a
personal grudge against one of the parties involved.86 Courts also have
held that due process sometimes precludes a decision maker from serving
as both an advocate and a judge in the same case, though the degree to
which this principle applies varies greatly depending on the nature of the
interest at stake.87 A decision maker also may be deemed biased if they
have “prejudged” the outcome of the case88 or if they have engaged in ex
parte communications concerning a pending dispute.89
Although some forms of bias—such as personal animus—translate
neatly into the legislative sphere, others quickly run up against the fact that
local legislators typically view themselves as legislators first, even when
they are asked to adjudicate individual disputes.
Consider, for example, the requirement that decision makers refrain
from engaging in any ex parte communications related to a pending
dispute and that they promptly disclose any relevant communications that
they happen to receive.90 As a number of courts have observed, “ex parte
communications from the public to their elected representatives are
perhaps inevitable given [their] perceived legislative position,” even if in
a particular instance they are supposed to be acting “in an adjudicative

85.
See, e.g., Rodgers v. 36th Dist. Ct., 529 F. App’x 642, 650 (6th Cir. 2013)
(requiring neutral decision maker hearing for termination of public employee).
86.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (pecuniary interest); Valley v.
Rapides Par. Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir. 1997) (personal bias).
87.
Compare Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 569–71 (1974) (allowing the
same officials to both investigate and adjudicate disciplinary matters within a prison), with
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1908–10 (2016) (finding a violation of due
process where a state supreme court justice participated in a decision to vacate a stay of
execution in a case that he himself had prosecuted).
88.
See, e.g., Cinderella Career & Finishing Schs., Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583,
590 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
89.
See, e.g., Ward v. U.S. Postal Serv., 634 F.3d 1274, 1279–80 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
90.
KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 7.7 (6th ed. 2019) (describing the need for a neutral, unbiased decision maker);
id. § 6.4 (prohibition on ex parte contacts).
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role.”91 Particularly with respect to controversial matters, such as a
pending development proposal or a particularly thorny termination
hearing, constituents inevitably will weigh in, not just through hearings
and petitions, but by calling their representatives directly or speaking to
them on the street.92
Courts have responded to this inevitability in a variety of ways—
some by adjusting the requirements of due process to accommodate the
realities of local legislative politics and others by insisting that legislators
conform their behavior to a more rigid set of administrative norms.93 The
Idaho Supreme Court, for example, has held that although council
members may from time to time receive unsolicited calls from their
constituents about the various disputes that come before them, due process
requires that they publicly disclose the names and identities of the
individuals who contact them and summarize the substance of the
comments made.94 The Idaho court expressly rejected the notion that “the
quasi-judicial standard ‘requires some fine tuning’” when applied to a
local legislative adjudication, insisting that the same rules ought to apply
to legislatures and agencies alike.95
Courts in a number of other states, however, have taken a more
permissive approach. Illinois courts, for example, appear to draw a line
between “mere expressions of public sentiment,” which need only to be
generally acknowledged in passing, and more extensive communications
that may need to be more fully disclosed.96 As one appellate court
explained, applying a more rigorous standard would be “unfair to local
decisionmakers. Local elected officials are almost always asked to wear a
legislative ‘hat’ when taking official actions. To ask elected officials to put
on an adjudicatory ‘hat’ and act like judges . . . places an unnecessary

91.
Waste Mgmt. of Ill., Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 530 N.E.2d 682, 698 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988); see also Fox Moraine, LLC v. United City of Yorkville, 960 N.E.2d 1144,
1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“Naturally, constituents will relay their concerns” to their
representatives, “unaware that the officials will be acting in an adjudicatory role and that
such ex parte communication is improper.”).
92.
Idaho Historic Pres. Council, Inc. v. City Council of Boise, 8 P.3d 646, 651
(Idaho 2000) (Kidwell, J., dissenting).
93.
Compare Peoria Disposal Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 896 N.E.2d 460,
475 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (acknowledging that a more flexible standard is necessary in the
legislative context), with Idaho Historic Pres. Council, 8 P.3d at 648–49 (holding that
legislative bodies are subject to the same strict rules that bind administrative agencies).
94.
Idaho Historic Pres. Council, 8 P.3d at 650–51.
95.
Id. at 650.
96.
See, e.g., Fox Moraine, 960 N.E.2d at 1172 (distinguishing between
undisclosed calls to which the council members had not responded and more extensive
communications that would have required disclosure).
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burden on both the individual decisionmaker and on the . . . process”
itself.97
Courts have similarly split on the question of whether a city council
member can be a “neutral” decision maker if they have already promised
to vote a certain way. As the Supreme Court has explained, a decision
maker is not biased “simply because he has taken a position, even in
public, on a policy issue related to the dispute.”98 After all, government
officials often approach matters with strongly held policy views that may
be largely dispositive of the case at hand.99 On the other hand, a decision
maker who has prejudged the facts of a particular case may indeed be
precluded from deciding on its outcome.100 For example, when the
chairman of the Federal Trade Commission indicated in a public speech
that certain companies with cases pending before the commission had
violated the law, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that due process
precluded the chairman from hearing those disputes.101
In the context of legislative administration, however, some courts
have reasonably questioned whether the same sorts of rules ought to apply.
Fox Moraine v. City of Yorkville102 illustrates the problem well. At issue
was the Yorkville Town Council’s decision to reject a proposal to establish
a new landfill at the edge of town. The proposed landfill had been a point
of contention in Yorkville for a number of years, as developers sought to
persuade the town first to annex the unincorporated tract of land on which
the landfill was to be located and then to approve the landfill permit

97.
Sw. Energy Corp. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 655 N.E.2d 304, 309–10 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995) (quoting Concerned Citizens for a Better Env’t v. City of Havana, No. 494-0759, 1994 WL 259510 (Ill. Pol. Control Bd. 1994) (Meyer, J., concurring)); see also
Tierney v. Duris, 536 P.2d 435, 443 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (finding no due process violation
where the ex parte contacts were not with the parties but rather “with relatively
disinterested persons” and council members disclosed the substance of the communications
in general terms).
98.
Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482,
493 (1976).
99.
Pro-labor members of the National Labor Relations Board, for example, will
predictably side with the unions, except in cases in which the facts point unequivocally the
other way. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 656, 659–60 (1949). Although
the employers who appear before the Board may feel that these members are “biased”
against them, courts have consistently refused to consider this a form of bias that raises due
process concerns. See, e.g., Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 509 F.3d
562, 571 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“A party cannot overcome [the] presumption [of impartiality]
with a mere showing that an official has taken a public position, or has expressed strong
views, or holds an underlying philosophy with respect to an issue in dispute.”) (quoting
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
100.
See, e.g., Cinderella Career & Finishing Schs., Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583,
590 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
101.
Id. at 591–92.
102.
960 N.E.2d 1144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
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itself.103 City officials initially seemed poised to approve the project, but a
local election shifted the tide decisively against it.104 Three new council
members and a new mayor were elected in part on a promise to reject the
landfill site, and shortly after the election they voted to do just that.105
The facts of Fox Moraine are hardly unique. Major development
projects often generate a great deal of community interest and not
infrequently become the subject of political campaigns. So long as these
decisions are left in the hands of local elected officials, voters inevitably
will seek to influence the outcomes through the political process. And
although many of the legislative biases come up in the context of local
land use disputes, similar patterns prevail in other contexts as well. School
board candidates run on promises to replace school leadership.106 City
council candidates vow to appoint a new chief of police.107 Once elected,
these same officials may find themselves presiding over formal
termination proceedings—raising questions about the degree to which
they can provide the sort of “impartial” tribunal called for as a matter of
due process or state employment law.108
Perhaps unsurprisingly, when presented with facts analogous to Fox
Moraine, courts have splintered on whether the norms of adjudication or
local politics ought to prevail. The California Supreme Court, for example,
has made clear that “[c]ampaign statements . . . do not disqualify [a]
candidate from voting on matters which come before him after his
election,” even when those statements indicate how a candidate will vote
in a specific dispute.109 “A councilman,” the court explained, “has not only
a right but an obligation to discuss issues of vital concern with his
constituents and to state his views on matters of public importance.”110 To
hold otherwise would fundamentally transform the character of local
elections. One North Carolina judge predicted that “the prudent candidate
[would] hide behind the phrase, ‘I am sorry, but I am not permitted to
discuss my position on the issues or matters [that] may come before me in

103.
Id. at 1149.
104.
Id. at 1154.
105.
Id. at 1150.
106.
Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908, 913–14 (10th Cir. 1977) (school board
candidate declaring that “no progress could be made . . . until there was a new
superintendent” and promising to make a change once elected).
107.
Clisham v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 613 A.2d 254 (Conn. 1992) (mayor
promising to fire chief and then appointing police commissioners who in fact fired him).
108.
Staton, 552 F.2d at 911; see also Siteman v. City of Allentown, 695 A.2d 888,
890 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (concerning legislative recusal in the context of a police
disciplinary appeal).
109.
City of Fairfield v. Superior Ct., 537 P.2d 375, 383 (Cal. 1975).
110.
Id. at 382.
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a quasi-judicial setting.’”111 City council races, he quipped, “w[ould]
become as boring as judicial races.”112
At the same time, there is something deeply uncomfortable in the
notion that an individual’s right to a fair hearing ought to simply give way
to a realist account of how local politics works. And perhaps in view of
this, a number of courts have insisted that when legislatures act “in a quasijudicial capacity,” they must be held to the same “high standard” that binds
the rest of the administrative state—and as a result may be precluded from
participating in deciding a case on which they previously have opined.113
As another court explained, although candidates for office are free to speak
on whatever topics they wish, “a due process principle is bent too far when
such persons are then called on to sit as fact finders” in a case that they
appear to have prejudged.114
The problem is that in practice, this latter approach may not
accomplish all that much. Because legislators and candidates are always
free to express their policy views, savvy officials can still signal precisely
how they intend to vote. And they can quietly assure their supporters in
still more explicit terms. Indeed, one might reasonably wonder whether
the greater threats to legitimacy and impartiality come from the sort of
public pronouncements that some courts have condemned—or from the
private assurances to donors and supporters that almost never see the light
of day.
***
A common theme that runs through all these cases is the recognition
that council members and commissioners do not in fact take off their
“legislator hats” when asked to rule on individual disputes. Although some
courts have tried to simply paper over that reality, others have tried to
accommodate it in various ways—either by adjusting the procedural
demands on legislative adjudication or by fine-tuning the substantive
standards of review.
The Fourth Circuit in Virginia Beach sought to make room for local
politics by allowing legislators to rely on constituent preferences as a
substantive justification for their decisions.115 But that approach, if applied
literally, would have amounted essentially to no review at all. It is
therefore unsurprising that the Fourth Circuit ultimately settled on a
standard that placed very little weight on politics at all.

111.
Dellinger v. Lincoln County, 832 S.E.2d 172, 182 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019)
(Berger, J., concurring).
112.
Id. (Berger, J., concurring).
113.
Id. at 178.
114.
Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908, 915 (10th Cir. 1977).
115.
AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir.
1998).
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On the other hand, there may indeed be value in letting up on the
requirement that legislators be completely “neutral” with respect to the
issues that come before them. The decision to vest decision-making
authority in a legislative body all but guarantees that voters will try to
influence the decisions that their elected officials make. Attempts on the
part of some courts to police the relationship between legislators and their
constituents under the guise of “impartiality” entail a fairly significant
intrusion into the legislative process without necessarily making
legislative hearings fairer. Courts may be better off ensuring that
legislative decisions conform to whatever substantive standards a
particular statute prescribes while otherwise allowing the legislative
process to play out as it does.
B. Reasoned Decision-Making and Legislative “Expertise”
In other contexts, legislative administration instead raises questions
about how courts can (or should) go about assessing the quality of agency
decision-making or the depth of agency expertise. Although courts are not
always willing to acknowledge the role of politics in agency decisionmaking, they typically are quick to recognize claims of expertise. Indeed,
courts often do so reflexively—without actually considering whether the
agency has any expertise to bring to bear. As I argued in Substance and
Procedure, when it comes to local agencies generally, there may be greater
reasons to doubt that the agency officials have the sort of expertise to
which courts must automatically defer.116 But the role of expertise
becomes still more perplexing when the “agency” making the decision is
in fact a local city council or a county board.
One context in which the question of expertise looms particularly
large is around environmental impact review. Under the Minnesota
Environmental Protection Act (MEPA), for example, the government unit
responsible for approving a new development project must first determine
whether to prepare an “Environmental Assessment Worksheet” (EAW) to
evaluate the likelihood that the project may cause environmental harm.117
A government unit’s determinations of whether an EAW is necessary
under the statute and the substance of the EAW itself are subject to judicial
review to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence
and are not otherwise arbitrary or capricious.118
At the state level, the EAW process is typically carried out by one of
the state’s two environmental agencies—the Pollution Control Agency or

116.
Ponomarenko, supra note 2.
117.
MINN. STAT. § 116D.04(1)(a)(c) (2020).
118.
Watab Twp. Citizen All. v. Benton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 728 N.W.2d 82,
89 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
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the Department of Natural Resources.119 At the local level, however, the
responsible government unit is, more often than not, a local city council or
a county board. Although courts have little trouble applying the familiar
administrative law standards to state agency decisions, they have at times
struggled with how best to apply them when local legislatures are
involved.
Consider, for example, a case involving the proposed construction of
new biking trails in a local park. In Protect Our Minnetonka Parks
(POMP) v. City of Minnetonka,120 a local environmental group petitioned
the city of Minnetonka to conduct an EAW to determine whether the new
trails had the potential to harm the surrounding wildlife preserve.121 Under
the MEPA, the city was required to conduct the EAW if “material
evidence” accompanying the petition showed that “there may be potential
for significant environmental effects.”122 The statute specifically outlined
the factors that the city was to consider, including the types and extent of
the environmental impacts and the degree to which these impacts might be
mitigated under the city’s plans.123 In short, the decision of whether to
prepare an EAW in the first place was itself supposed to be based on a
technical (albeit somewhat more general) assessment of environmental
harm.
Although the resolution denying POMP’s petitions ostensibly
complied with the requirements of the statute, the discussion at the city
council meeting at which the resolution was adopted strongly suggested
that the decision was not in fact the product of “reasoned decisionmaking”
or “agency expertise.”124 The resolution itself, which likely was prepared
by city staff, explained why the city believed that the various
environmental harms that POMP identified were either too minimal to
count as “significant” under the statute or were simply unlikely to occur.125
The discussion at the city council meeting, however, focused on an entirely
different set of concerns.126 All four of the city council members who voted
to reject POMP’s petition described the EAW process as something that
was just not worth doing at the time.127 One council member expressed
concerns about the potential harm to the local bumblebee population but
119.
See, e.g., Pope Cnty. Mothers v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 594
N.W.2d 233, 235 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
120.
No. A18-1503, 2019 WL 2495648 (Minn. Ct. App. June 17, 2019).
121.
Id. at *1.
122.
Id. at *2.
123.
Id.
124.
Reply Brief of Relator at *11–13, Protect Our Minnetonka Parks v. City of
Minnetonka, No. A18-1503, 2019 WL 1756594 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2019).
125.
Protect Our Minnetonka Parks, 2019 WL 2495648, at *3–4.
126.
Reply Brief of Relator, supra note 124, at *11–13.
127.
Brief and Addendum of Relator at *22, Protect Our Minnetonka Parks v.
City of Minnetonka, No. A18-1503, 2019 WL 1756592 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2019).
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felt that the results of an EAW “would not be particularly satisfying in the
end.”128 Another did not think the EAW would “give us any further
information.”129 Still another said she opposed the EAW because it was
promoted by “people who are looking for that as a reason to prevent the
project.”130 The staff members who worked on the resolution also voiced
a number of concerns that the city was not supposed to be taking into
account. The city’s Natural Resources Manager, for example, expressed
concern that the EAW would cost between $25,000 and $50,000 and that
approving POMP’s petition would be “setting a new precedent” for
undertaking EAWs in the future as well.131
Under Minnesota law, courts are instructed to afford “substantial
deference” to agency decisions based largely on grounds of agency
expertise.132 And for highly technical determinations, this deferential
posture is entirely warranted when the decision in question is made by a
state agency whose staff members have decades of experience on which
to draw.
It is much less clear, however, why this same level of deference was
warranted in POMP. The city council almost certainly lacked the requisite
expertise to assess the environmental impacts of the proposed
development. Indeed, based on the hearing transcript, it does not appear
that they even fully grasped the nature of the judgment that they were
being asked to make.
The court, for its part, was untroubled by the council members’
comments. The court explained that what mattered was the substance of
the resolution adopted by the city council, not the various comments made
by individual council members and staff.133 And because there was indeed
some evidence in the record to support the resolution, the court was bound
to defer.
The council members in POMP may have been particularly forthright
in their discussions, but their decision-making process was likely
altogether typical of how legislative officials approach environmental
review. Even when there are “experts” involved in the process—either
municipal staff members or hired consultants—the decision-making
authority ultimately rests with the local legislative body itself. The
MEPA’s statutory language suggests that the decision of whether to
conduct an EAW is meant to be fact-based and non-discretionary. It states

128.
Id. at *36–37.
129.
Id. at *12.
130.
Id.
131.
Id. at *8–10.
132.
Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev. v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs,
713 N.W.2d 817, 832 (Minn. 2006).
133.
Protect Our Minnetonka Parks, Inc. v. City of Minnetonka, No. A18-1503,
2019 WL 2495648 at *5–6 (Minn. Ct. App. June 17, 2019).
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that the government unit “shall order the preparation of an EAW if the
evidence . . . demonstrates that . . . the project may have the potential for
significant environmental effects.”134 But unless the evidence points
unequivocally in one direction or another, the local legislative body retains
considerable discretion in deciding whether review is warranted. It is hard
to imagine that in exercising that discretion, legislators are doing anything
other than what the Minnetonka City Council had done in POMP—
namely, considering the costs of preparing an EAW, the possibility of
delay, and the overall likelihood that a more thorough review would
support whatever outcome the legislators prefer.
***
Although there undoubtedly is room to quibble with the POMP
court’s deferential posture, the real problem that it highlights may be with
legislative administration itself. The POMP court might, for example,
have concluded on the basis of the record that the city council had not in
fact engaged in “reasoned decisionmaking” as required by the statute. And
this would perhaps have been a more honest assessment of what in fact
occurred. But in practice, it may not have had much of an effect on council
decisions going forward. Future legislators might be more circumspect in
their assessments. But it seems doubtful that their decision-making
processes would necessarily change as a result. In the absence of actual
expertise with which to judge the evidence before them, the sorts of
considerations that weighed heavily on the Minnetonka council members
would undoubtedly continue to hold sway.
III. LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS
As the examples in the preceding pages make clear, legislative
administration has not always conformed perfectly to the demands of
administrative law. Some courts have responded to this by insisting that
legislatures must behave differently, others by suggesting that
administrative law itself must adapt. This Part concludes with some
preliminary thoughts on reconciling the practical reality of legislative
administration with the norms of administrative procedure. It then
suggests some possible directions for future study, including the ways in
which local administrative practice could help inform debates in federal
administrative law.
A. Assessing the Need for Legislative Administration
If there is one theme that runs through all of the preceding cases, it is
the fact that legislators invariably see themselves as legislators first—even

134.
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when they are asked to adjudicate individual disputes. At least in some
contexts, it may be worth considering whether a different decision maker
may be better suited to perform the task.
The environmental review cases discussed above are a case in point.
As discussed above, the MEPA imposes a series of non-discretionary
obligations on local governments.135 The factors that localities must
consider are highly technical, and they require little in the way of local
knowledge of the sort that legislators are more likely to possess.136 At the
same time, as POMP makes clear, involving legislators in the decisionmaking process invariably results in their considering a variety of factors
that the statute ostensibly precludes—most notably the costs and delays
associated with conducting the required reviews.137 Judicial review can
perhaps ferret out the more egregious cases, but it can only do so much.
Courts, after all, are also not particularly adept at scrutinizing
environmental harms.
A state-level agency, on the other hand, may be in a much better
position to produce an unbiased impact review. A state agency could be
tasked with conducting a review from start to finish or simply evaluating
the evidence compiled by a local government unit to determine whether
various statutory criteria have been met. The Illinois Environmental
Pollution Control Act, which governs local approval of waste disposal
facilities, offers a possible model along these lines.138 Although it vests
local siting authorities with the responsibility for gathering the required
information and making a preliminary determination, it permits aggrieved
parties to appeal to the state’s Pollution Control Board, which then
conducts a de novo review applying its own “technical expertise.”139
A similar approach could work in a variety of other contexts as well.
Where there is genuine concern about the possibility of bias, for example,
state-appointed hearing officers could preside over administrative
proceedings—and at the very least be responsible for developing the
135.
A local government unit “shall” prepare an Environmental Assessment
Worksheet (EAW) if it determines that a proposed project “may have the potential for
significant environmental effects,” and it “shall” conduct a still more thorough assessment
if the preliminary worksheet demonstrates that these impacts are in fact likely to occur.
MINN. R. 4410.0200, Subps. 24, 26 (2018); MINN. R. 4410.1100, Subp. 6 (2018) (emphasis
added).
136.
MINN. R. 4410.1700, Subp. 7 (2018) (describing the relevant criteria,
including the likely environmental impacts, cumulative impacts, and opportunities for
mitigation).
137.
See supra notes 120–28 and accompanying text. See also Peder Larson &
Julie Perrus, Reforming Environmental Review, BENCH&BAR MINN., Jan. 2010, at 34, 37
(noting that “units of government might also be biased by economic considerations or not
informed enough of the science underlying environmental concerns”).
138.
See Town & Country Utils., Inc. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 866 N.E.2d
227, 229–30, 238 (Ill. 2007) (describing the statute and the role of state experts).
139.
Id. at 238.
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records on which decisions must be made. In short, it may be worth
exploring whether all of the administrative functions discussed in the
preceding pages should in fact be left in legislative hands.
B. Tailoring the Standards of Judicial Review
In other contexts, the political character of legislative bodies may be
more a feature than a bug. When it comes to zoning and land use policy,
for example, the decision to involve legislative bodies in the administrative
process may reflect the fact that these judgments are not fully
administrative to begin with. The question of whether to grant a
conditional use permit to build a new retail center, for example, or to
rezone a specific parcel to permit a non-conforming use involves an
individualized determination and may therefore be an “adjudication” in
the traditional parlance of administrative law.140 But it also is a political
judgment about the development of a particular neighborhood or the needs
of its residents.141 It should not be surprising that these sorts of decisions
have often been left in legislative hands.
Recognizing the political character of local land use decision-making
does not require courts to completely abdicate their responsibility for
reviewing adjudicative judgments—but it does perhaps say something
about the forms that this review might take. If certain functions are vested
in local legislative bodies on account of their democratic pedigree, courts
should perhaps be wary of interfering with the democratic process by
holding local legislative bodies to a strict set of administrative norms.
When it comes to the administrative requirement of “impartiality”—and
the related prohibition on ex parte contacts—there may be value in
adopting a more flexible approach.
On the other hand, there may be less of a reason to adopt a separate
“legislative” standard of substantive judicial review because the necessary
flexibility may already be built into the underlying statutory scheme. For
example, in determining whether to grant a conditional use permit,
legislators typically are permitted to consider a variety of factors,
including whether a proposed use would be “compatible with the character
and development in the vicinity” or whether it would be “detrimental to

140.
See Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a
Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 844–46 (1983) (noting that in some
jurisdictions these sorts of decisions are deemed “legislative,” whereas in others they are
characterized as “adjudicative”).
141.
It is precisely for this reason that some state courts have deemed at least
some individualized determinations to still be “legislative” in character, even if they affect
a single parcel of land. Id. (noting that a number of states characterize all amendments to
zoning ordinances—including those that affect just one parcel of land—as “legislative”
judgments).
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the continued use, value, or development” of neighboring properties.142
These vague standards already give legislators plenty of leeway to
consider the needs of their constituents without courts having to make any
special accommodations to the standard of review. Of course, where the
statutory criteria are more specific, legislators may be bound to follow the
evidence where it leads. But the very specificity of the criteria implies that
the decision is meant to be an objective one that is relatively free of
political influence. Indeed, this is precisely where the Fourth Circuit went
awry in Virginia Beach. The TCPA had already settled on the optimal
balance between local land use preferences and the demands of a national
mobile network. The court’s attempts to create still more room for local
preferences threatened to upend the balance that Congress itself had
struck.
C. Learning from Local Administrative Law
Finally, although there are many reasons to study local administrative
practice for its own sake, it also has the potential to inform debates in
federal administrative law.
One of the striking features of local administrative practice is the
degree to which it forces courts to grapple with questions that rarely
bubble up in federal court. The scholars who have debated the proper place
of politics in federal agency decision-making, for example, have focused
primarily on a handful of cases in which federal courts have confronted
the question directly.143 At the local level, however, these sorts of cases
number in the hundreds. Local officials, it seems, are far less adept at
obscuring the messy reality of administrative decision-making behind a
veneer of objectivity and expertise. Because there are fifty state supreme
courts, which regularly split on various administrative doctrines, it may be
possible to see how different formulations have played out over time.
Kathryn Watts has argued, for example, that federal courts should allow
agencies to rely more explicitly on political considerations to justify their
regulatory choices and has suggested that courts over time could learn to
distinguish between “permissible” political influence and “crass political
horse trading.”144 It seems altogether likely that a closer look at local
administrative caselaw could help shed light on the degree to which that is
likely to prove correct.

142.
See, e.g., Check into Cash of Miss., Inc. v. City of Jackson, 158 So. 3d 1252,
1254 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).
143.
See, e.g., Watts, supra note 8; Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political”
Oversight of Agency Decision-Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010); Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
144.
Watts, supra note 8, at 54–55.
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The same is true in a variety of other contexts as well. Some state
supreme courts, for example, have adopted a much more robust version of
the nondelegation doctrine—and as a number of scholars have argued, the
states’ experience with nondelegation offers important lessons for federal
courts as they grapple with the question of whether to revive the doctrine
at the federal level as well.145 Similarly, in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Department of Commerce v. New York,146 a number of
scholars have considered the degree to which courts should try to ferret
out pretextual justifications for agency decisions.147 This, too, is an area
on which local administrative law could potentially shed some light.148
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Essay was to provide a preliminary account of
legislative administration. It is necessarily a first cut—one that barely
scratches the surface in capturing either the breadth of legislative
administration or the many ways in which it challenges familiar
administrative norms. What it makes clear, however, is that legislative
administration is a distinct form of administrative practice that
undoubtedly warrants a closer look.

145.
See, e.g., Benjamin Silver, Nondelegation in the States, 75 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3758233;
Daniel E. Walters, Decoding Nondelegation After Gundy: What the Experience in State
Courts Tells Us About What to Expect When We’re Expecting, EMORY L.J. (forthcoming
2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3809905.
146.
139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
147.
Id. at 2558–59 (striking down the Department of Commerce’s decision to
add a citizenship question to the census as pretextual).
148.
See, e.g., Or. Ent. Corp. v. City of Beaverton, 19 P.3d 918, 922–23 (Or. Ct.
App. 2001) (considering whether there was sufficient evidence to show that the city
council’s reasons for denying a conditional use permit to an adult business were pretextual
and that the real reason for the denial was the council’s opposition to the adult nature of
the business).

